St. John's Law Review
Volume 40
Number 1 Volume 40, December 1965, Number
1

Article 15

CPLR 205(a): Failure to Choose Jury and Proceed to Trial Held
Equivalent to Neglect to Prosecute
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1965]

BIANNUAL SURVEY

itations, and due to the 127 day lapse between its expiration and
the granting of leave to sue. Caution should be exercised if reliance is to be placed on this opinion in view of the inherent
incongruity present when requesting a court to grant leave to
sue long after the applicable statute of limitations has expired.
CPLR 205(a): Failure to choose Jury and proceed to trial held
equivalent to neglect to prosecute.
CPLR 205(a) provides a six-month extension for the commencement of an action after the termination of a prior similar
case if such termination was for a reason other than voluntary4
discontinuance, neglect to prosecute, or a decision on the merits.
In Schunman v. Hertz Corp.,' the extension provided by CPLR
205 (a) was held inapplicable where the plaintiff wilfully failed to
choose a jury and proceed to trial in the previous action. This,
the court stated, was tantamount to neglect to prosecute and, therefore, excluded from the benefits conferred by CPLR 205(a) .
Previously, the courts allowed the six-month extension, holding that
failure to select a jury and proceed to trial was not neglect to
prosecute.7 The court in Schuman made no reference to the
prior contrary authority. The instant case appears to be consistent,
however, with recent judicial opinions checking the abuse of
CPLR 205(a) where the action is not actively pursued by the
plaintiff.CPLR 213(9): Fraud statute of limitations runs from discovery
where fraud is extraneous to original tort.
In DeVito v. New York Cent. Sys.,9 the complaint set out a
cause of action for common-law fraud based on the defendant's
fraudulent disclaimer of ownership of property upon which plaintiff
was injured by defendant's alleged negligence. The defendant, in
pleading the defense of the statute of limitations, claimed that the
gravamen of the action was actually the original negligence of
4CPLR 205 (a). The exception dealing with a final judgment on the
merits seems to be superfluous since a subsequent action would be res
judicata.
5 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (lst Dep't 1965).
6 See CPLR 3216.
7 Scbneck v. S. T. Grand Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 923, 174 N.Y.S.2d 749, aff'd
without opinion, 6 App. Div. 2d 1047, 179 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2d Dep't 1958);
2 WEmnsmxN, KoRN & MImLER, NEW YoRx CIVI
PRACTiCE f1205.06

(1964).

8 Wright v. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d
63 (2d Dep't 1964); 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 205, supp. commentary 21, 22
(1965); 7B McKniNNY's CPLR 216, supp. commentary 77 (1965).
9 22 App. Div. 2d 600, 257 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1st Dep't 1965).

